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Abstract
This paper explores links between self-control in decision-making and self-
disconnection by households using energy prepayment meters. Self-disconnection
happens when households exhaust all available credit in their meter and are
left without a supply of energy because they have been unable to top-up.
This has serious consequences for the well-being of households and also in-
creases firms’ costs. We explore behavioural characteristics associated with
self-disconnection and present saving plans to help households minimize self-
disconnection. We show that, in our sample, stated self-disconnection is
positively associated with lower levels of goal achievement. We also show
that households which have already experienced self-disconnection are more
likely to accept an energy savings plan. It is relevant and promising that
these households tend to select saving plans most likely to minimise their
likelihood of self-disconnection. Our findings give some useful insights for
energy policy-making, both for policy-makers interested in alleviating energy
poverty and for energy utilities keen to limit self-disconnection.
Keywords: Prepayment meters, Household finance, Goal achievement,
Self-disconnection
Email addresses: martaproenca@gmail.com (Marta Rocha), mbaddeley@gmail.com
(Michelle Baddeley), mpollitt@jbs.cam.ac.uk (Michael Pollitt), mw217@cam.ac.uk
(Melvyn Weeks)
1Nova School of Business and Economics, Universidade Nova de Lisboa
2Institute for Choice, University of South Australia Business School
3Bartlett Faculty of the Built Environment, University College London
4Judge Business School, Energy Policy Research Group, University of Cambridge
5Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
1. Introduction
Research in economics and psychology suggests that many important
choices involve inter-temporal trade-offs between immediate and delayed costs
or benefits. In order to evaluate such trade-offs, decision-makers compare the
costs and the benefits of outcomes occurring at different times. However, peo-
ple can be impatient in the sense that they tend to prefer to enjoy immediate
rewards and to defer costs.6
Prepayment metering is an interesting case to study these inter-temporal
trade-offs. This type of metering requires the energy payment to be made
before actual consumption takes place; that is, households have to pay for
electricity and/or gas (immediate costs) before they consume it (the bene-
fits are delayed). This allows for self-disconnection, which happens when a
household exhausts all available credit, is unable to top-up and so is left with-
out supply of energy, but without the energy utility actively disconnecting
them for failure to pay their bills.
For some UK consumers, prepayment meters are combined with an emer-
gency credit facility, so that vulnerable households can be protected from
energy cuts at least for short periods of time e.g. a weekend. Nonethe-
less, self-disconnection can have serious consequences for the well-being of
households. Lack of heating and associated health risks, especially for the
vulnerable and elderly are a significant threat. In addition, there will be
nutritional consequences if interrupted energy supply impairs food prepara-
tion, exposing the fuel poor to vulnerability from food poisoning. There will
also be leisure and psychological impacts, associated with shame or loss of
self-esteem (see ConsumerFocus (2010))7 Likewise, self-disconnection gener-
6Strotz (1955) was the first to model impatience for near-term trade-offs rather than
for future ones, modelling it as a commitment device, showing that, under exponential
discounting, preferences are time-consistent, but under non-exponential discounting agents
may prefer to constrain their own choices. See also Frederick et al. (2002), O’Donoghue
and Rabin (1999), O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001).
7Self-disconnection is especially pronounced among low-income households and is asso-
ciated with fuel poverty (Brutscher (2012), O’Sullivan et al. (2013)). In addition, fuel
poverty has been regarded as a likely contributor to increased winter mortality rates
(Rudge and Gilchrist (2005)). In defining what we mean by fuel poverty, here we use
the Low Income High Cost (LIHC) relative definition of relative fuel poverty, which was
introduced in England following Hills (2012) Review. By this definition, a household is
fuel poor if it has lower than average income and higher than average fuel costs. For
further discussion of fuel poverty indicators, see Moore (2012).
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ates costs for the energy suppliers since it may contribute to lower energy
consumption and higher costs associated with reconnecting of energy supply
after self-disconnection.
Our paper explores two issues related to self-disconnection. First, we
examine whether behavioural characteristics are associated with a propensity
towards self-disconnection. Second, we propose energy savings plans designed
to help households minimize their incidence of self-disconnection throughout
the year. We then test empirically consumers’ preferences for these plans.
We explore whether households are willing to accept one of the designed
saving plans and correlate these preferences with the households’ behavioural
characteristics.
Our empirical analysis is based around a survey conducted in collabora-
tion with British Gas, designed and implemented across a sample of British
Gas customers using gas pre-payment meters. The survey includes several
questions related to behavioural characteristics. In particular, we have de-
signed a question to assess the level of goal achievement by the household
member in charge of topping-up the gas meter. We used this measure of goal
achievement as a proxy for self-control, as discussed in more detail below.
Our results show that stated self-disconnection is positively associated
with lower levels of our measure of goal achievement. We also show that a
self-determined regular top-up seems to be an effective solution in reducing
self-disconnection, however it does not completely offset it. In addition, we
show that households which have already experienced self-disconnection are
more likely to accept a savings plan. The most popular type of savings plan
chosen by the households, in our sample, was a commitment to a regular
payment schedule through the year, via mutual agreement with the energy
supplier. This suggests that households have a level of insight into their
vulnerability to self-disconnection, because this plan is also the plan most
likely to minimise the likelihood of self-disconnection.
Our research contributes to the empirical literature on behavioural eco-
nomics and energy economics. There are a small number of research stud-
ies on self-disconnection, see for example Brutscher (2012), Doble (2000),
O’Sullivan et al. (2013) and O’Sullivan et al. (2016). These studies do not,
however, explore whether goal achievement (and other behavioural charac-
teristics) can explain self-disconnection. Furthermore, our paper suggests
novel policy instruments that can help reduce the negative impact of self-
disconnection and tests whether households would be willing to accept such
saving plans.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section lays out
the background on prepayment metering and the drivers of self-disconnection.
It explores, using an illustrative example, how time inconsistency can lead
to self-disconnection and presents the different saving plans as potential so-
lutions. Section 3 presents our survey and describes the data. Section 4 de-
scribes the methods we use in our empirical analysis and Section 5 presents
our results. Section 6 concludes with a summary of findings and a discussion
of policy implications.
2. Prepayment meters and self-disconnection
Prepayment meters (PPMs) emerged as a means of offering indebted do-
mestic consumers the ability to pay their energy bills. For the British Gas
gas pre-payment customers participating in this survey, they all used phys-
ical keys or cards to activate their meters following top-up at a convenient
PayPoint or Post Office.8 This allows the household to decide the amount of
energy to be consumed in anticipation of their future consumption. Energy
PPMs are very widely used, for example by energy suppliers in Australia,
Canada, Mozambique, New Zealand, South Africa, UK and Zambia. Ofgem
(2015) estimates for Great Britain suggest that, by 2012, the number of PPM
accounts had increased to around 4.2 million household electricity accounts
(15.5% of the total) and 3 million household gas accounts (13.3% of the to-
tal). The number of PPMs continued to increase in 2014. By 2014 in the
UK there were 4.5 million electricity PPM accounts and around 3.4 million
gas accounts (Ofgem (2015)).
One important feature of PPMs is that, when the credit is exhausted,
the supply of energy can be interrupted and the household ’self-disconnects’.
O’Sullivan et al. (2011) have observed that the misleading use of the term self-
disconnection is problematic because it erroneously implies that households
have agency and are making a voluntary choice to disconnect themselves.
This, however, is the common phrasing adopted in the academic literature
8More generally, prepayment households insert credit into their meters by the use of, for
example, a key or card that is then used or spent when electricity or gas is consumed in the
home. Also, as technology improves, other options are becoming available, including top-
up codes for online top-up. For more information about the range of pre-payment meters
offered by British Gas, see https://www.britishgas.co.uk/products-and-services/gas-and-
electricity/tips-and-advice/prepayment-meters-guide.html
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(O’Sullivan et al. (2011)). It is also commonly used in policy papers (see for
example ConsumerFocus (2010) and Vyas (2014). So we use it here too. This
is in contrast to involuntary disconnection imposed by energy suppliers e.g.
when supply is disconnected (not temporarily interrupted) because customers
have defaulted on bills. Self-disconnection also differs from when households
limit their energy use to save cash.9
In order to overcome the immediate negative impacts from self-disconnection,
especially for vulnerable households in the winter, some suppliers offer an
emergency credit. This is a fixed value (usually £5 in the UK) of gas or
electricity that is made available, at no extra cost, when a household runs
out of credit (Vyas (2014)).10 Brutscher (2012) analysed the prevalence of
self-disconnection using metering data from households with a British Gas
electricity prepayment account, over the period 2007-2010. He found that,
in 2010, around 78% of households had never self-disconnected; 12% had
self-disconnected once; and around 3% of households had self-disconnected
more than four times in the year. O’Sullivan et al. (2016), using a postal
survey in New Zealand, found that 40% of the respondents had experienced
self-disconnection events lasting for at least 12 hours and 17% of the respon-
dents reported that their last self-disconnection event had lasted up to 24
hours. There is a significant variation between these two studies. We note,
however, that self-disconnection is more prevalent among gas prepayment
customers (the focus of our analysis here) than among electricity prepay-
ment customers. A household is more likely to self-disconnect gas because it
is most commonly used for heating, and the demand for heating is relatively
elastic in comparison, for example, to the demand for lighting. For vulnera-
ble households this creates significant problems. When financial constraints
force households to resort to leveraging their relatively elastic demand for
heating in the short-term, then this makes them vulnerable to long-term
health consequences that they cannot afford to worry about if their day-to-
day priorities revolve around paying bills: lack of heating in winter months
is likely to be associated with increased morbidity rates.
9This is usually referred in policy papers as self-rationing (for example, see Consumer-
Focus (2010)).
10Some energy suppliers have also offered a similar feature to the emergency credit,
usually named ‘friendly credit’, which consists of not allowing disconnection in certain
periods over the day, whatever the household’s usage or credit status. These options give
more time for households to top up their card.
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2.1. Drivers of self-disconnection
Another characteristic of self-disconnection is that it allows households
to opt for discrete jumps in their energy consumption. These discontinuities
in energy consumption can be explained by lumpy transaction costs, cogni-
tive constraints (forgetting to top-up and/or forgetting, from one season to
the next, the negative impacts from self-disconnection), financial constraints
and/or coordination issues (O’Sullivan et al. (2013), Brutscher (2012),Con-
sumerFocus (2010)). Brutscher (2012) also identified a seasonal pattern
to self-disconnection. Unsurprisingly, it is less likely to happen during the
spring/summer in colder climates 11 Brutscher argues that time-inconsistency
is one possible explanation. Consumers with shifting rates of time preference
may experience preference reversals over time, i.e. they change their mind
over time. For example, during the winter, a household might plan to save
in order to avoid self-disconnection, but when the summer arrives and other
more imminent pressures and constraints become more salient then their
preferences and choices shift. Households vulnerable to shifting preferences
will be more vulnerable to self-disconnection.
To test this hypothesis about the links between self-disconnection, time-
inconsistency and preference reversal, Brutscher (2012) incorporated two ad-
ditional time-inconsistency questions, following a standard format for time
preference questions.12
The time preference questions were addressed to the individual in charge
of topping-up the meter, and to those households who had experienced self-
disconnection at least twice over the period 2007-2010. Brutscher (2012)
found that households where the individual in charge of purchasing top-
ups demonstrated a propensity for preference reversal (as measured by the
time-inconsistency questions) were more likely to self-disconnect in the au-
tumn/winter than households in which the person in charge did not suffer
11In hot climates, seasons have opposite impacts in terms of increased demand for air-
conditioning during hot weather. In countries with extreme fluctuations in weather, these
pressures will hit in both winter and summer.
12The questions were as follows: 1) ‘would you prefer to receive £350 guaranteed today
or £400 guaranteed in 1 month?’ 2) ‘would you prefer to receive £350 guaranteed in
6 months or £400 guaranteed in 7 months?’ If the respondents chose £350, the same
question would be asked for £450. If respondents still chose £350, they were asked ‘how
much would we have to offer you to take the higher amount’. It is important to note
however, that the evidence is mixed on whether or not these types of hypothetical, self-
reported preferences are truly reflective of real preferences.
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from preference reversals. These findings suggest that behavioural biases
can, at least partially, explain self-disconnection.
2.2. Illustrative example
Below we show an example in order to explain firstly, how time-inconsistency
can lead to self-disconnection and secondly, how a savings plan can reduce
the likelihood of self-disconnection. This example is an application of the
consumer behaviour design used in DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) and
DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004).13 Their paper focuses on the household
preferences and behaviour, but to simplify the analysis we will embed the
assumption that firms will not change their decision-making in response.
Consider an energy supplier who offers a energy prepayment plan to a
household. There are three periods. In period 0 the household signs the pre-
payment plan. Period 1 is spring/summer and period 2 is autumn/winter.
These periods can be considered on a smaller time scale, e.g. within a given
season. The households consume energy in both periods 1 and 2. The pre-
payment plan incorporates two payments from the household to the energy
supplier: p1 in period 1 and p2 in period 2. For simplicity, assume no up-
front or sign-up fee. The household consumes less energy in period 1 than
in period 2 and so their payment is smaller in period 1 than period 2 (i.e.
0 < p1 < p2). Positive consumption generates a positive benefit b > 0 and
we assume for simplicity that the benefits for the consumer are the same in
period 1 and 2. These benefits are deterministic and known. Assume the
household needs to save in period 1 in order to pay in period 2 (i.e. if they
do not save in period 1, then they will be forced to self-disconnect in period
2). Let the cost of saving in period 1 be c > 0, and assume that this cost
is known to the household only in period 1, but it is drawn from a known
distribution F . Assume that F has a strictly positive density f over R.
In order to incorporate preference reversals we follow the (β, δ) prefer-
ences, where δ ∈ [0, 1] is a standard discount factor and β ∈ [0, 1] is a dis-
counting parameter, representing time inconsistent preferences, specifically
the degree of present bias, consistent with Laibson (1997).14 A household
13DellayVigna and Malmendier use the present biased or (β, δ) preferences, as applied
in many papers drawing on seminal insights from Laibson (1997) about time inconsistency
and quasi-hyperbolic discounting .
14Present bias is the tendency of households to give disproportionate weight to payoffs
that are relatively closer in time when considering trade-offs between two future moments;
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with (β, δ) preferences has a discount factor βδ between the present and the
next period, and a discount factor δ between any two adjacent periods in the
future. Let β̂ be a household’s beliefs about its true β. A time consistent
household is characterized by β̂ = β = 1. A sophisticated household is fully
aware of its inconsistency and so, β = β̂ < 1. The household is näıve when
β < β̂ = 1.
In period 0, the household decides whether or not to accept the prepay-
ment plan. The outside option has utility of zero. If the household accepts the
prepayment plan, then it assigns discounted net utility βδ(b−p1−c+δ(b−p2))
to saving in period 1, and βδ(b−p1) to not saving in period 1. Thus, in period
0 the household would like to save in period 1 if:
βδ(b− p1 − c+ δ(b− p2)) ≥ βδ(b− p1)⇔ c ≤ δ(b− p2). (1)
In period 1, the household has to decide whether to save or not in order
to consume in the next period. The discounted net utility, in period 1, is
b−p1−c+βδ(b−p2) to saving, and b−p1 to not saving. Hence, the household
saves in period 1 if
b− p1 − c+ βδ(b− p2) ≥ b− p1 ⇔ c ≤ βδ(b− p2). (2)
The smaller is β the more likely it is that the household will not save in
period 1 and therefore, will be more likely to self-disconnect in period 2.
Saving plans
One possible way of reducing the likelihood of self-disconnection in period
2 is to increase the payment p1 in period 1, thus enabling the household to
save. Suppose the firm increases the payment in period 1 such that the
household pays a share of p2 in period 1, that is p
′
1 = p1 + ∆ and p
′
2 = p2−∆
where 0 < ∆ ≤ p2. The household will choose to save if c′ ≤ βδ(b− p′2). For
a given c, the saving condition is more likely to hold because p′2 < p2.
There are two issues related to this change in payments. First, the change
in payments may affect the likelihood that the household will accept the
prepayment plan in period 0. That is, in period 0, the household will sign-up
for the prepayment plan if βδ(b−p′1− c′+ δ(b−p′2)) ≥ 0. If δ is close enough
for example, in the short-term, they will favour a payoff in a week to a week-and-a-day;
but in the long-term, they will favour a payoff in a year-and-a-day to a payoff in a year,
i.e. their time preferences are inconsistent.
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to one (i.e. if the household is patient enough), then this change in payments
should not affect the sign-up. We note, however, that the households we
wish to target lack self-control, leaving them vulnerable to self-disconnection.
They do have the spare cash required to save and face higher costs than
benefits from self-disconnection. Given these higher costs, if they are strictly
rational then they should be prepared to save to avoid self-disconnection. But
they lack the self-control to save, and this failure to implement a strategy to
avoid self-disconnection reflects inconsistent preferences.
Second, the increase in p1 will increase the probability of incurring saving
costs. Hence, a time-consistent household will be less inclined to accept this
change in payment. The same applies to a fully näıve household because
it behaves as if were a time-consistent household (i.e. is unaware that they
will face negative consequences in the future) given that β < β̂ = 1. The
sophisticated household is fully aware of its time inconsistency and therefore
will be more willing to accept this change in payments given that it will
reduce their chances of self-disconnection.
2.3. What could a saving plan look like in practice?
Ideally, a field experiment would be the most robust way to test for the
effectiveness of any given energy saving plan. However, field experiments can
incur large monetary and logistical costs and it is important firstly to test the
basic principles via a preliminary assessment of what types of saving plans
are acceptable to consumers. The empirical focus of this paper is to conduct
the initial research via a preliminary assessment of real consumers’ attitudes
towards different potential savings plans. We explore households’ stated pref-
erences for different energy saving plans and correlate these preferences with
household characteristics. This is an important first step in understanding
self-disconnection and possible ways of minimising it. Here, we present some
different designs for energy saving plans, including two savings plans to en-
courage the behaviour changes to ameliorate self-control problems, building
on the analyses above.
We use a survey to assess households’ preferences for the different cus-
tomer plans, as follows:
• Regular payments throughout year: Based on a summary of the previous
year’s consumption, the customer agrees to an equal weekly/monthly
amount and commits to this payment schedule through the year.
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• Summer fixed extra payments: The customer commits to additional
fixed payments just during summer months. These additional payments
could be calculated on the basis of wintertime gas consumption in the
previous year, not necessarily equal payments throughout the year.
The extra payments would be used to cover higher gas payments in the
wintertime.
Going beyond economics, psychologists have analysed extensively goal
setting and have reported evidence that goals help to increase performance,
including self-set goals (Locke and Latham (2012)). More recently, goal set-
ting has been studied by economists and there is now a growing literature
studying the performance of goals showing, theoretically and empirically, that
goals, including self-set goals, can have a positive impact on performance and
can counteract present-bias.15
In order to test whether a household would be more or less willing to
accept a self-set goal, we have designed the following two additional saving
plans:
• Voluntary savings target. The customer chooses a savings target about
which they feel comfortable/confident. The customer is responsible for
meeting this target and it is up to them whether or not it is achieved
in any given month. The credit saved can be used to offset winter
consumption. The customer is free to choose how much to save in
each week, but is allowed to postpone savings giving them additional
flexibility.
• Ad-hoc extra payments. The customer makes additional payments as
and when they can afford to do so. The customer would not have
to nominate a target for savings, but the more they save the more
winter consumption will be offset. This is the plan that offers the
most flexibility of all commitment contracts, although it is not a real
commitment, only an awareness device.
15In a theoretical framework, Hsiaw (2013) demonstrates that goals, in the form of
targets, that are sufficiently realistic for reference-dependent agents can counteract present-
biasedness. Harding and Hsiaw (2014), using a data from a Northern Illinois goal setting
program applied to residential electricity consumption, show that households who are
aware of their present bias and wish to save electricity choose to save in accordance with
their chosen goals (if those goals are realistic).
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As noted in the example above, a näıve household is not aware of its time
inconsistency and therefore, would be less likely to accept a saving plan that
increases its likelihood of incurring a cost associated with saving. Literature
suggests that a reminder or feedback may still have positive effects in im-
proving self-control. In particular, Karlan et al. (2016) argue that a reminder
can be effective because time inconsistency can be linked to a failure to fore-
cast future expenditure . Reminders can ameliorate this problem to some
extent. In behavioural public policy, the ”nudging” approach advocated by
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) does focus on re-designing ”choice architecture”
to encourage choice-making that is more beneficial to the individual, and an
important facet of a well-designed choice architecture, according to Thaler
and Sunstein, is to provide frequent and salient feedback. A energy consump-
tion feedback mechanism would be consistent with these policy insights.16
In order to assess household preferences for reminders or feedback mech-
anisms, we have designed the following feedback in the prepayment meter
context.
• Feedback on consumption. Without changing the payment plan, the
household receives regular feedback in the summer about the average
gas payments. For example: ‘Last year you spent £20 on gas between
July and September and you spent £120 on gas between October and
December’.
3. Data
3.1. Sample summary statistics and stated self-disconnection
The data source was responses to a survey developed and conducted in
collaboration with British Gas, specifically targeted at British Gas gas pre-
payment customers. The survey was implemented online between January
and February 2013 and was sent via email to 20,000 customers, with 11%
16In the energy domain, Asensio and Delmas (2016), using a randomized controlled
trial with residential electricity households, show that message framing can have a posi-
tive impact on conservation behavior. Another example is from Allcott and Rogers (2014)
demonstrating that energy reports, with a social comparison element, can have a poten-
tial impact on energy conservation. In the savings domain, Karlan et al. (2016) show
that reminder messages increase the likelihood that individuals achieve their saving goals.
Relating to gym attendance, Calzolari and Nardotto (2017) show that weekly reminders
can induce users of a gym to increase their gym attendance over an extensive period.
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of surveys not delivered because of incorrect or out-of-date contact details.
The customers contacted were those identified as being most likely to be re-
sponsible for paying the gas bills within the household. Participation in the
survey was voluntary and no monetary incentives were involved. In total,
we obtained 1539 responses, however for certain questions we had a lower
number of observations to use in econometric estimations.17
The use of an online survey is a likely contributor for the low response
rate because response rates for online surveys are usually lower than the re-
sponse rates for other field research methods such as face-to-face interviews
(Couper (2000),Couper (2017)). The research team was not able to contact
respondents directly because we were not permitted to see the contact details
of British Gas customers. So British Gas was required to send the emails
to meet their obligations to secure client privacy under the UK’s Data Pro-
tection Act 1998. The fact that the emails were sent by British Gas could
have had an impact on the response rate if discontented customers were less
inclined than others to answer the survey. Also, some customers may have
classified British Gas emails as spam, decreasing the number of emails actu-
ally received and read by potential respondents. To minimise these negative
impacts on potential response rates, potential respondents were informed
that the research was a collaboration between British Gas and University
of Cambridge and that their responses would be confidential to the research
team, and no individual details revealed to British Gas. Contact details for
the researchers were provided, in case respondents had questions and con-
cerns. We expected a relatively low response rate, as is generally true for
online surveys (Couper (2000), Couper (2017)) and so we aimed to send the
survey to a much larger number of potential respondents than we needed to
secure a suitable sample size.
The survey included a series of detailed questions about the respondents’
demographics (i.e., age, gender, education, number of adults in the house-
hold and income), alongside questions to assess self-disconnection history,
behavioural characteristics and energy saving plan choices. For a summary
of the main variables employed in the paper see Table A1 in the appendix.
Table 1 compares the age and gender of the respondents of the survey with
the group of customers who have a contract with British Gas for the supply
17This was especially the case for the questions about income and number of children
in the household.
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of gas through a prepayment meter. While there are no significant differences
(at 5% level) in relation to gender, there are differences in relation to age
intervals. In particular, the number of young people answering our survey
was not representative relative to the population of customers on British
Gas contracts. Specifically, fewer young people responded and, therefore,
our survey results are skewed towards older people. So one caveat on our
analysis is that it is more likely to be representative of older consumers.
However, within this group, elderly consumers are an important group of the
vulnerable fuel poor, with higher winter-time mortality rates than other age
groups and so policy solutions are needed to enable this group specifically to
plan their energy consumption and savings more effectively.18
Table 1. Survey sample: control variables
Category Survey sample (%) PPM Gas in BG (%)
Gender Male 37.8 40
Female 62.2 60
Age 21 and Under 0.2 2.2
22 to 34 5.7 25.9
35 to 44 20.7 24.4
45 to 54 38.6 24.7
55 to 64 25.1 13.8
65 and Over 9.7 9.1
18We were not able to correlate the responses with a broader range of characteristics, for
example income and socio-economic status, because British Gas does not automatically
collect these data and we were constrained by British Gas to work with the household
characteristics already included in British Gas’ surveys.
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Table 2.
Summary statistics of explanatory variables
Whole sample Stated SD Stated EC
Obs Mean 95% Conf. Interval Mean Mean
Age
21 and Under 1539 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
22 to 34 1539 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.06
35 to 44 1539 0.21 0.19 0.23 0.21 0.22
45 to 54 1539 0.39 0.36 0.41 0.43 0.41
55 to 64 1539 0.25 0.23 0.27 0.23 0.23
65 and Over 1539 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.06
Female (=1) 1539 0.62 0.60 0.65 0.66 0.64
Household adults 1521 2.19 2.13 2.24 2.26 2.26
Income levels
Low income 1232 0.41 0.39 0.44 0.41 0.38
Medium income 1232 0.42 0.39 0.44 0.44 0.45
High income 1232 0.17 0.15 0.19 0.16 0.17
Education levels
None 1387 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.12
Basic 1387 0.34 0.32 0.37 0.35 0.34
Medium 1387 0.38 0.35 0.40 0.40 0.40
Higher 1387 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.14
Behavioural characteristics
Saving behavior (=1) 1183 0.24 0.22 0.27 0.27 0.21
Top-up all year (=1) 1505 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.07
Inconvenient (=1) 1480 0.33 0.31 0.36 0.43 0.36
Low goal achievement (=1) 1163 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.09
Medium goal achievement (=1) 1163 0.30 0.27 0.32 0.37 0.32
High goal achievement (=1) 1163 0.60 0.57 0.63 0.52 0.57
NB: SD = self-disconnection; EC = emergency credit. See Table A1 for full definitions.
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Summary statistics for our sample of households are provided in Table 2.
Column 1 reports mean values for the whole sample. The respondents in the
sample are, on average, between 45 and 54 years old, with basic and medium
levels of education and lower and medium levels of household income. The
household is composed, on average, of two adults.
Information about household income and education is captured by a
group of dichotomous variables, where the reference variables for each group
are low income, and no education or basic education.
Table 2 also provides summary statistics for our measures of self-disconnection
and emergency credit. These are self-reported measures based on specific sur-
vey questions. The respondents were asked two short statements, and their
responses were captured on a Likert scale.19 We asked the following ques-
tions:
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?
1. I rarely use the emergency credit.
2. Sometimes the emergency credit runs out.
The first question we label as ‘emergency credit’, the second as ‘self-disconnection’.
To clarify the difference, the two questions are addressing different aspects of
emergency credit and self-disconnection. As explained above, self-disconnection
and emergency credit are closely related because emergency credit is a form of
‘grace’ period, before actual self-disconnection takes hold. The first question
captures households who are perhaps ‘dabbling’ with emergency credit. They
may seem vulnerable to self-disconnection but may not ever self-disconnect
(e.g. if they are just procrastinating about topping-up). In fact, these house-
holds may, in some senses, be rational if leaving it to the very last minute to
top-up allows them to economize on the transactions costs associated with
an inconvenient topping-up process. The second question captures those
households who actually face the harsh reality of self-disconnection - their
emergency credit runs out and they are left without gas. This is likely to
be about more than procrastination and may link to other behavioural con-
straints and/or other non-behavioural constraints, such as poverty, which are
preventing households from topping-up. The households who are experienc-
19A standard 5-point Likert scale was used, incorporating the following responses:
strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; and strongly disagree.
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ing problems with emergency credit running out are likely to be those who
would benefit most from an effective energy savings plan.
We constructed binary variables to capture more distinctly the patterns
in use of emergency credit and experience of self-disconnection. To capture
those respondents who do use emergency credit in general we labelled the
first question stated emergency credit and we assigned value of one if the
respondent answering that they ‘strongly disagree’ or ‘disagree’ with the
statement that they rarely use emergency credit, and zero otherwise. To
contrast with the groups who have actually self-disconnected, we labelled the
second statement stated self-disconnection and assigned value of one if the
respondent answered ‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’ to the ’Sometimes emergency
credit runs out’ and a value of zero otherwise. In our sample, at least 62%
of the respondents stated that they had already used the emergency credit
facility and around 39% had already self-disconnected at some point.
In section 5, we have also considered other definitions of these two vari-
ables as robustness tests. For instance, we conducted ordered probit estima-
tions using the full range of the Likert scale responses to check the robustness
of our binary classifications derived from these responses. We also conducted
additional estimations to show that how the ‘neither agree nor disagree’ re-
sponses were included in the binary dependent variables did not significantly
affect the econometric results.
3.2. Survey data on behavioural characteristics
For the conditioning variables, we constructed a measure to assess the
level of goal achievement of the individuals and used this as a proxy for
self-control. Psychologists have considered the impact of conscientiousness
on self-control and goal achievement links to the conscientiousness trait, as
explored in the economic psychology literature on the Big Five personality
traits (e.g. see McC (a), McC (b), Costa and McCrae (1992), Costa and
McCrae (2005), Costa and Widiger (1994), Borghans et al. (2008), Baddeley
(2019). In particular, psychology literature has pointed to conscientiousness
as an important predictor of academic performance, mostly associated with
sustained effort and goal setting, e.g. see Conard (2006).
We focussed on goals broadly defined, because this links with goal achieve-
ment, as the most relevant facet of conscientiousness in explaining self-control
in the context of self-disconnection. Due to the limited number of questions
in the survey, we designed a single question that we further use to construct
a measure of goal achievement. This question provides broad information
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about goal task, planning and procrastination issues, as opposed to a more
in-depth analysis of goal achievement.
Which of the following statements best describe you? (Choose two re-
sponses at most)
(a) I usually achieve my goals.
(b) I usually set-up weekly or monthly goals that I wish to achieve.
(c) I usually avoid or delay a task that requires a lot of thinking.
(d) I have difficulties in completing a task that requires organization.
(e) I don’t usually achieve my goals.
Aside from a) and e), these options are not mutually exclusive and so we
did not ask the respondents to choose just one. To categorise the different
possible combinations of responses, we delineated three different levels of goal
achievement: high goal achievement, medium goal achievement, and low goal
achievement. Individuals who usually achieve their goals would select the
statements a) or a) with b). Those with a medium level of goal achievement
would select b), c) and/or d) but not a) or e). Those with a low level
of goal achievement would select e) alone or in combination with b), c) or
d). Overall, the majority of the respondents (60%) are considered as high
goal achievement types against 9% of the sample categorised as low goal
achievement and 30% as medium goal achievement. This index has some
limitations in the sense that it is composed from self-reported variables and
therefore, it is most likely subject to self-reported bias, but it does correlate
to some extent with a number of observable measures.20
In addition to goal achievement, we also measured other behavioural
characteristics that can help explaining self-disconnection. As noted above,
a possible explanation for a household using the emergency credit or self-
disconnecting is that it is inconvenient to top-up, for example due to trans-
action costs. That is, every time households need to top-up, they have to
go to an outlet, or if the payment can be made through an online account,
households still need to have access to internet.21 In order to take into ac-
count this factor we have asked the respondents to answer, on a scale from
‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’, the statement ‘Pay As You Go makes
20Table A2 shows how our measure of goal achievement correlates with observable vari-
ables.
21Other reasons may include liquidity constraints or lack of income.
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it easy to pay for my gas’. From this we constructed the binary variable
inconvenient equal to zero if the household had answered ‘strongly agree’ or
‘agree’ to the question, and equal to one otherwise.22
The respondents were also asked to state whether they top up more over
the winter or roughly the same over the year. This is summarised in the
variable top-up all year - equal to one if household i tops up roughly the
same all year around and zero if household i tops up much more over the
winter. The majority of the respondents choose to top-up according to their
needs, and so their top-ups were more frequent over the winter. From those
households who top up roughly the same all year round, only 29% had self-
disconnected; whereas 41% of those who top up more during the winter
had already self-disconnected. This is a particularly interesting finding as it
shows that those households who do not have a self-imposed regular payment
schedule through the year, are more vulnerable to self-disconnection.
In addition, even though British Gas does not have a facility for energy
savings (one of the reasons why we were testing households’ likely uptake of
a resolution to this problem) we were interested to know whether households
are more or less likely to save spare cash. So we included a question asking,
on a scale from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’, ‘When I’m using less
gas in warmer months I like to add any spare cash to my savings’. This was
redefined into the variable saving behaviour : equal to one if the household
strongly agreed, agreed or neutral, and zero otherwise.
3.3. Survey data on saving plans
Regarding the questions on the preferences about the saving plan, we did
not ask open-ended questions. Instead, we gave a specific text for each of
the saving plans, similar to the saving plans’ description in section 2.3 and
asked the respondents which of the plans they would prefer.23
These questions capture stated preferences rather than revealed prefer-
ences. Stated preference questions tend to suffer a number of limitations
e.g. see Louviere et al. (2000). Stated preference questions involve hypo-
thetical scenarios, which can lead to two problems: (1) respondents may find
some trade-offs difficult to evaluate because they are unfamiliar with options
22In all re-defined variables throughout the analysis, the ‘don’t know’ option was
dropped.
23See Appendix for the questions related to the saving plan choice or the online appendix
for the full questionnaire.
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on offer, in this case the suggested saving plans; and (2) as the number
of attributes increases, the complexity and the number of combinations for
comparison increases, which may lead to decreased engagement in the survey
from the respondents, limiting the reliability of the responses.
Revealed preference analysis was not feasible for this analysis because
it was not possible for British Gas to offer its customers energy savings
plans as part of this study. Nonetheless, stated preference questions are
still informative, and can be used to obtain hypothetical data and estimate
the likely attractiveness of the saving plans. This information is useful in
understanding people’s preferences over choices not yet available, for example
in the design of new technologies for which revealed preference data are not
yet available. For these reasons we took great care in explaining the different
plans in detail and focussed on differences in the attributes across the plans.
We included in the survey one extra alternative (‘none of the options’)
and we used this as our reference choice, to allow that some respondents do
not want any energy savings plan at all. No savings plan is also the current
status quo option for all customers given that it is the only payment option
currently available to respondents. So it is, in practice, their reference point.
Table 3 shows the distribution of the energy savings plan choices avail-
able to the households in the sample. Interestingly, when asked to choose
between the different saving plans or none of the options, around 36% of
the households chose the regular payments throughout the year, followed
by almost 15% choosing the feedback option. Respondents were least inter-
ested in voluntary savings and the summer fixed payments. It is interesting
that the most popular options were the least flexible (regular payments) and
most flexible (no savings plans at all) suggesting that there are significant
individual differences across the respondents across the spectrum of savings
plans suggested. In the econometric analysis, we will explore how these
different savings preferences link to individual differences and specifically to
behavioural factors associated with time inconsistency and goal achievement.
19
Table 3. Distribution of the saving plans
Saving plan Freq. Percent Cum.
Regular payments 458 36.46 36.46
Voluntary savings 106 8.44 44.9
Ad-hoc payments 131 10.43 55.33
Summer fixed payments 47 3.74 59.08
Feedback on consumption 187 14.89 73.96
None of the above 327 26.04 100
Total 1,254 100
Both low-income households and those stating that they had self-disconnected
deserve special attention, especially those answering that they were not in-
terested in any savings plans. Table 4 shows the choices made by these two
sub-groups of households. For both these sub-groups, households prefer a
regular payment throughout the year, as for the rest of the sample. There
are, however, some interesting links within this sub-group. Around 90 house-
holds who had stated they self-disconnected preferred not to have a saving
plan. One reason for this might be that these households are unaware of
their limited self-control. In fact, 41 respondents out of the 90 who were not
attracted by a savings plan, had stated they self-disconnected even though
they thought they had high levels of goal achievement. This can be argued
as a sign of naiveté, consistent with the categorisations in O’Donoghue and
Rabin (1999, 2001), as outlined above. Feedback about energy consumption
patterns might help increase the salience for individuals of their potential
self-control constraints, and/or it might increase the salience of information
about the extent of energy consumption increases in the winter-time for these
households. Another explanation could be that households are facing binding
liquidity/financial constraints and so have no access to the spare cash that
might enable them to save.24
Failing to understand the savings plans offered is another potential ex-
planation for the inconsistency in these respondents’ belief in their own goal
achievement versus their self-disconnection experience. Of the 90 respondents
not attracted by any savings plan, 33 had a history of self-disconnection and
reported lower levels of educational attainment. So another possibility is
24Ideally, we would have liked to ask more questions about wealth so that we could have
tested this hypothesis empirically, but questions about financial position were precluded
as potential violations of British Gas customers’ privacy.
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that the energy savings plans offered were difficult to understand. This un-
derscores the importance of avoiding esoteric and excessively formal language
in communicating different options for energy savings.25
Table 4. Saving plan choices by sub-groups of households
Saving plan Low income Stated self-disconnection
Regular payments 142 179
Voluntary savings 44 41
Ad-hoc payments 51 48
Summer fixed payments 14 20
Feedback on consumption 53 74
None of the above 116 90
Total 420 452
Notes: Pearson chi2(5) = 15.739 (p = .008) for the cross-tabulation between saving plan
and low income. Pearson chi2(5) = 15.252 (p = .008) for the cross-tabulation between
saving plan and stated self-disconnection.
In summary, most households appear to be interested in some sort of
energy savings plan and in general, they agree that it would be a good way
to spread the cost of seasonal changes in gas use.26 We find that those
households stating they have already self-disconnected would like to commit
to a saving plan. When asked specifically about their preferred saving plan,
a significant percentage of the households chose the regular payments saving
plan as their preferred plan, although many respondents expressed concerns
about the lack of flexibility implicit in this sort of plan. Alongside concerns
about loss of flexibility, respondents were also worried about lack of spare
cash, potential increases in gas prices, forgone savings interest from energy
savings during the summer, the likelihood they might forget to save, and also
their mistrust of the firm.
25This problem affects all consumers across a range of consumer choice problems and
there is evidence that people choose many options, including in the context of online shop-
ping, without properly understanding the terms and conditions attached to the options.
26Households were asked to answer in a scale from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree”
the following statements about their preferred saving plan: ‘It would be a good way to
spread the cost of seasonal changes in gas use.’; ‘It would help me focus on budgeting to
cover my gas needs.’; ‘It sounds too complicated.’; ‘I’d worry about losing the credit I had
saved.’; and ‘It could help me reduce my spending on non-essential purchases’.
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4. Estimation Strategy
To unravel some of the associations between propensity to use emergency
credit and vulnerability to self-disconnection, in this section we estimate
a range of econometric models to capture these phenomena as a function of
behavioural characteristics and other conditioning variables. Given potential
endogeneity of the behavioural characteristics, we use a range of estimation
methods, as explained below. In addition, we estimate a model designed to
capture the types of households which might be willing to accept an energy
savings plan.
4.1. Stated self-disconnection
Given that emergency credit and self-disconnection are linked for many
consumers, we modelled stated emergency credit, eci and stated self-disconnection,
sdi together in a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) system. SUR allows
the different dependent variables to be generated by processes that are in-
dependent except for the correlated errors. Let us assume that stated emer-
gency credit for household i is identified by the latent variable ec∗i and that
sd∗i is the latent variable measuring stated self-disconnection for household
i. The first model becomes:




1 if ec∗i > 0
0 otherwise.
The second model becomes:




1 if sd∗i > 0
0 otherwise.
where x1i is a vector of demographic characteristics, x2i is a vector of be-
havioural characteristics (with the exception of our measures of goal achieve-
ment) and x3i is a vector of our goal achievement variables. We use high goal
achievement as a reference category in our estimations. The error structure
can be described as follows:
(µ )1i µ2i ∼ N {( 0 ) 0, ( 1 ) ρρ1}
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where ρ captures the correlation in the error terms between self-disconnection
and emergency credit.
4.2. Preferred saving plan
In the second step of our analysis we show a theoretical framework for
households choosing a saving plan. To re-cap on the options offered, a house-
hold i is faced with a choice between the following alternatives or plans: (1)
regular payments throughout year, (2) voluntary savings target, (3) ad-hoc
extra payments, (4) summer fixed extra payments, (5) feedback on consump-
tion, (6) none of the options.
Following the additive random utility model for multiple alternatives (see
Cameron and Trivedi 2005), the household utility associated with the jth
choice can be represented as
Uij = x
′
iβj + εij, j = 1, ..., 6 (5)
where Uij represents the utility of household i of saving plan j. εij is
the random component of utility that stands for the households’ unobserved
characteristics. βj is a vector of alternative-specific parameters.
Each household decision is based on choosing the plan that offers the
highest utility level. A certain household i chooses saving plan j if the utility
derived from it is higher than the utility that he had derived from choosing
‘none of the options’ and from all other saving plans, Uij ≥ Uis, for all j 6= s.
The choice s, ‘none of the options’, is used as the reference choice. Then, the
probability for household i to choose saving plan j is given by:
Pr (PPi = j) = Pr (Uij ≥ Uis,∀j 6= s) = Pr (x
′
iβj + εij ≥ x
′






iβs ≥ εis − εij,∀j 6= s) (7)
We assume that the errors εij are i.i.d. type-one extreme value, with
density
f(εij) = e
−εijexp(−e−εij), j = 1, ..., 6.










then takes the following form:
Pr (SPi = j) = F (β0j + β1jx1i + β2jx2i + β3jx3i + β4jeci + β5jsdi + εij) (8)
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where SPi represents household i’s decision about saving plan j. Controls
x1i, x2i and x3i are as before. This is estimated using a multinomial logit
(MNL). By estimating equation (5) using a MNL model, we examine the
direct impact of demographic and behavioural characteristics on the proba-
bility of choosing between one of the saving contracts against the reference
category of not choosing any of the listed options.
The MNL has some obvious problems. One assumption underlying MNL
which undermines its efficiency is the assumption of independence of irrele-
vant alternatives (IIA). This property states that the ratio of the probabilities
of choosing one alternative over another, if both alternatives have a non-zero
probability of choice, is not affected by the presence or absence of any addi-
tional alternatives in the choice set Louviere et al. (2000). This assumption is
quite strong and it may not hold, for example when two or more alternatives
are closer substitutes than the other alternatives.
To address this potential problem, we use the Hausman test as the stan-
dard procedure to test whether the IIA property in the MNL is violated.
Further, this property implies that the random term in the utility function is
independent across alternatives and identically distributed. This is related to
another problem of the traditional multinomial logit which is the assumption
of homogeneous tastes for observed attributes. A further relevant source of
heterogeneity, not considered in the MNL, is scale heterogeneity which refers
to heterogeneity in variance associated with the random term in the utility
function. This potential limitation is not so relevant in our case as we have
only one choice situation and, therefore, it would be hard to identify the
parameters that characterize heterogeneity in choice behavior of the saving
plans.
5. Results
5.1. Emergency credit and self-disconnection
As explained in section 4, estimation results for emergency credit and
self-disconnection are obtained by estimating equations (1) and (2) through
a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model. Table 5 reports the average
marginal effects and conditional probabilities. The two equations are statis-
tically significantly correlated (ρ = 0.278). This result implies that the error
terms of both equations are correlated and we gain a more efficient estima-
tor by estimating the two equations jointly compared to estimating them
separately. Inconvenience of top-up increases the predicted probability of
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self-disconnection by around 16%; whereas top up all year decreases the pre-
dicted probability of using the emergency credit and of self-disconnection by
around 14%.27 A self-setting regular top up seems to be effective in reducing
self-disconnection, although it does not completely offset it. Saving behaviour
(i.e. being more prone to save) affects significantly and negatively the use of
emergency credit but is not significantly associated with self-disconnection.
Hence, self-imposing a commitment mechanism such as saving during warmer
months is not sufficient in minimising self-disconnection. In addition, educa-
tion does not seem to affect the use of emergency credit or the tendency to
self-disconnect. We also find a significant relationship between goal achieve-
ment and self-disconnection. Note that we have used, as a reference category,
the high level of goal achievement. Thus, moving from the high category to
the medium category increases the predicted probability of self-disconnection
by 9.6%. This emphasizes our next result, that goal achievement, to some
extent, plays a role in self-disconnection. We control for goal achievement
only in equation (2) since the use of emergency credit is not necessarily
related to self-control issues, as noted above. A household may use the emer-
gency credit because they simply forgot to top up, or it may even be the
case that the emergency credit is being used as a short small interest free
‘loan’, and hence its use is rational. The last column of Table 5 reports
the conditional predicted probability of self-disconnection given that emer-
gency credit has been used. These effects are similar to the average marginal
effects of self-disconnection, including the statistical significance of the vari-
ables. The reverse conditional probability does not apply in our case, because
self-disconnection mostly happens once emergency credit runs out.
27Notice that these are categorical variables and so the marginal effects show how the
probability of stated self-disconnection and stated emergency credit change as the cate-
gorical variable, e.g. inconvenience of top-up, changes from 0 to 1.
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Table 5. Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit: stated EC and SD
Average marginal effects Conditional Probability
EC SD Pr(sd = 1 | ec = 1)
Demographics
65 and over -0.172* -0.201** -0.184**
(0.090) (0.091) (0.095)
Female -0.010 0.019 0.022
(0.035) (0.035) (0.036)
No. of adults in household 0.040*** 0.026* 0.021
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Education
Medium 0.047 0.019 0.013
(0.035) (0.035) (0.037)
High 0.022 -0.009 -0.014
(0.048) (0.048) (0.049)
Behavioural characteristics
Saving behavior -0.081** 0.016 0.030
(0.032) (0.032) (0.034)
Top up all year -0.152*** -0.143** -0.126**
(0.054) (0.059) (0.062)
Inconvenient 0.009 0.158*** 0.165*
(0.035) (0.033) (0.034)
Low goal achievement 0.110** 0.116**
(0.056) (0.059)
Medium goal achievement 0.096*** 0.102*
(0.035) (0.036)
ρ 0.278 LL -1152.4
Wald χ2(24) 82.13 Prob> χ2 0.000
Obs. 905
Notes: Average marginal effects reported. Standard errors (Delta method) in
parentheses. Significance levels ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
LL= log likelihood. Reference categories: Age to 34; low education; low income;
high goal achievement. Ages 65 and over omitted. SD =self-disconnection; EC
=emergency credit. See Table A1 for full definitions.
Robustness Check. The model above relies on the definitions of the
dependent variables. To test the robustness of our definitions, and specifi-
cally to ensure that our estimations are not distorted by how we included
the ‘neither agree nor disagree’ responses, we tested the same model, seem-
ingly unrelated bivariate probit, using an alternative definition of the depen-
dent variables, self-disconnection and emergency credit, dropping the ‘neither
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agree nor disagree’ category. Table A3 reports the results. No sign and/or
statistically significant changes happened in the parameters for the emer-
gency credit estimations. Similarly for the self-disconnection model, the sign
and significance of the main explanatory variables did not change. The simi-
larity between the models with the two different definitions suggests that the
treatment of ‘neither agree nor disagree’ in the construction of the variables
did not make a significant difference.
We also tested a seemingly unrelated bivariate ordered probit model.
This estimation method also allows for correlation between the latent vari-
ables underlying the two dependent variables, i.e. self-disconnection and
emergency credit, even after controlling for observables. However, the latent
variables are ordered in a scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Ta-
ble A3 shows that the results remain significantly similar to the coefficients
obtained through the seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model.
5.2. Preferred Saving Plan
Though a significant percentage (around 36%) of households have chosen
regular payments saving plan as their preferred option, as shown in Table
6, a number of respondents expressed concerns about the lack of flexibility
implicit in such an option. In order better to understand these concerns, we
investigated more deeply which type of household has chosen each plan.
Table 6 shows the estimation results for the choice of the preferred saving
plan. All the saving plans are compared to the alternative choice ‘none of the
options’ - which captures those respondents who are not interested in any
savings plan at all. Keeping all other variables at their means, the predicted
probability of choosing a regular payment plan instead of keeping with the
current plan is 18.7% higher for those who find pre-payment meters to be an
inconvenient way to pay. In addition, the predicted probability of choosing a
voluntary savings plan as opposed to keeping the current plan is 5.4% higher
for those who top-up all year around and 3% for those who has a saving
behavior. We further note that although our goal achievement measures
are relevant determinants of self-disconnection, these are not statistically
significant in the multinomial choice of the saving plans analysed here.
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Table 6. Multinomial logit: preferred saving plan
Regular Voluntary Ad-hoc Summer fixed Feedback
payments savings payments payments on consumption
Demographics
65 and over -0.186** -0.075 0.003 0.039** 0.113**
(0.073) (0.049) (0.043) (0.018) (0.047)
Female -0.016 0.018 0.032 0.004 -0.001
(0.037) (0.021) (0.024) (0.011) (0.027)
No. of adults in household 0.029 -0.003 -0.012 -0.003 -0.009
(0.016) (0.009) (0.011) (0.005) (0.012)
Education
Medium -0.063* 0.005 -0.034 0.002 0.025
(0.037) (0.020) (0.023) (0.010) (0.028)
High -0.073 -0.020 -0.026 -0.001 0.092***
(0.051) (0.030) (0.032) (0.016) (0.034)
Stated emergency credit -0.056 -0.013 0.021 0.030** 0.034
(0.036) (0.019) (0.023) (0.012) (0.027)
Stated self-disconnection 0.010 0.019 -0.010 0.015 0.037
(0.036) (0.019) (0.022) (0.010) (0.026)
Behavioural characteristics
Saving behavior 0.003 0.031* -0.042* 0.018* 0.023
(0.034) (0.019) (0.021) (0.010) (0.025)
Top up all year 0.021 0.054** 0.000 -0.024 -0.023
(0.061) (0.028) (0.037) (0.027) (0.048)
Inconvenient 0.187*** 0.002 -0.028 0.002 -0.014
(0.037) (0.021) (0.025) (0.010) (0.028)
Low goal achievement -0.105 -0.040 0.031 0.022 0.038
(0.065) (0.042) (0.034) (0.015) (0.045)
Medium goal achievement 0.025 0.015 -0.020 0.000 0.017
(0.038) (0.020) (0.025) (0.011) (0.028)
Pseudo R2 0.046 LL -1359.48 Prob > χ2 0.000
Obs. 905
Notes: Base comparison: ‘None of the options’. See also Table 5 notes.
The Hausman test of IIA assumption were computed and we cannot re-
ject the null hypothesis of non-violation of IIA. Nevertheless, there is still a
possibility that there is scale and taste heterogeneity in the data that we are
not taking into consideration through a MNL model.
In summary, although our multinomial logit model did not show that
goal achievement was a significant predictor of respondents’ choices across
the different types of saving plans, nonetheless we do find that goal achieve-
ment has a role in predicting self-disconnection. We show that an inter-
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nal commitment/self-commitment device is not sufficient in eliminating self-
disconnections. We find that a household who has already experienced self-
disconnection has a greater probability of accepting a saving plan.
6. Conclusion
This paper presented empirical evidence on the role of behavioural char-
acteristics in explaining self-disconnection. We designed and implemented
a survey specifically for prepayment gas households in the UK. Our results
showed that, in our sample, stated self-disconnection is positively associated
with lower levels of goal achievement. A self-setting regular top up could
be effective in reducing self-disconnection, however it would not completely
offset it. In addition, we designed different saving plans that can contribute
to a decrease in the likelihood of self-disconnection. We examined whether
a household would be willing to accept different forms of saving plan. We
found that a household who has already experienced self-disconnection has
a greater probability of accepting a saving plan. The most attractive type
of saving plan chosen by the households in our sample was regular payments
throughout the year, involving a commitment agreed with the firm to follow a
set payment schedule. This is particularly relevant given that this is the sav-
ing plan that is most likely to minimise the likelihood of self-disconnection.
These findings help to address some important policy questions around en-
abling poorer households more effectively to plan their energy consumption.
If they are less able to accumulate savings during the summer months, either
because they do not have convenient ways to save and/or because they are
prone to time inconsistency or low levels of goal achievement, then offering
them energy savings plans may help them to manage their energy bills more
effectively throughout the year. This analysis suffers from some limitations,
including the fact that the response rate was low, though this is common
with online surveys.
In terms of limitations and directions for future research, these could
focus on expanding the sampling frame to address some of the limitations
associated with this form of survey. The response rate was low, though
this is not uncommon with online surveys. The focus on British Gas con-
sumers may have created some sampling biases if specific groups were more
likely to be non-respondents than others. Specifically, we had a relatively
low number of responses from young people under 22 years of age. Whilst
this is representative of most ordinary households, for young people in mul-
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tiple occupancy housing, there will be an additional range of drivers and
constraints. These could be explored in more extensive surveys, including
stratified surveys targetted at the general population and towards captur-
ing representative sub-samples. Also, the consumers surveyed were using a
limited range of pre-payment meters and future research could be designed
to explore what is possible with new generation pre-payment meters.The
framing of the questions in terms of the language used may have affected
responses and future research could embed experimental designs designed to
capture how different framing affects respondents’ stated preferences. This
aspect could also be captured by complementing this standard survey anal-
ysis with surveys designed within the context of a discrete choice modelling
methodology, following methodologies outlined by Train (1998, 2003); Train
and Weeks. Smart meter technologies could, for example, be designed to
incorporate energy savings tools, thus providing another route for improv-
ing energy efficiency and convenience for a wide range of users, especially
for those vulnerable to fuel poverty. If these new capabilities are to be ef-
fectively realised, designers need a strong grounding in real evidence about
real energy users answering some crucial questions. What characterises pre-
payment customers’ behaviour? What do they want/need? What do they
choose? From a behavioural economics perspective, these desires/needs and
choices might diverge and policy can play a key role in bringing desires, needs
and choices closer together. Our evidence demonstrates the importance of
understanding that different people will want/need different capabilities with
their smart and pre-payment meters. They will be driven by different goals
and behavioural characteristics and will face different economic, financial and
behavioural constraints.
The link to energy poverty emphasizes the importance of the present
study in providing specific, simple solutions to increase levels of energy com-
fort and efficiency. The savings solutions suggested in this paper have the
potential to increase welfare by more effectively matching preferences with
choices. They would not necessarily require any additional costs for the
government if energy utilities can be shown that reduced likelihood of self-
disconnection will be in their commercial interests, as well as in the interests
of their customers. Smart meter technologies could enable tailoring of energy
plans to take account of some of the differences in individuals’ preferences
which we have identified. So, if well-designed and properly implemented,
smart meters have the potential to be unequivocally beneficial in increasing
social welfare. Nonetheless, our results suggest that further research is war-
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ranted to test the effectiveness of the proposed energy savings plans, includ-
ing which features of the saving plans generate minimum self-disconnections
in practice. Another potential limitation would be if energy savings plans
just crowd-out other forms of savings, and so have neutral impact on total
household savings. This paper provides a first step in answering these impor-
tant economic and policy issues from a behavioural economics perspective,
and hopefully will precipitate further research exploring these questions and
potential solutions more fully.
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Table A1. List of main variables
Age of respondent Categorical ordered variable.
Female Gender dummy, Female=1 and Male=0.
Household adults No. persons with more than 16 years old in the household.
Income Household monthly income, including any benefits.
Low =1 if household monthly income ≤ £1000, otherwise = 0
Medium =1 if household monthly income between £1001 & £2000, otherwise=0
High =1 if household monthly income is over £2000, otherwise=0
Education Education level of the respondent.
None =1 if highest education lower than basic, otherwise =0
Basic (O-levels) =1 if highest education is basic , otherwise =0
Medium (A-levels, vocational) =1 if highest education is medium, otherwise =0
High (University degree) =1 if highest education is higher education, otherwise =0
Stated emergency credit I rarely use the emergency credit.
To what extent do you agree Strongly disagree=1, to Strongly agree=5.
with the statement? =1 if ec=1, 2 or 3; and =0 otherwise.
Stated self-disconnection Sometimes the emergency credit runs out.
To what extent do you Strongly disagree=1, to Strongly agree=5.
agree with the statement? =1 if sd=5, 4 or 3; and =0 otherwise.
Top up timing
Which statement is most applicable =0 if “I top up more over winter than summer.”
to your spend on gas over the year? =1 if “I top up roughly the same all year around.”
Saving behaviour When I’m using less gas in warmer months,
To what extent do you agree with? I like to add any spare cash to my savings.
Strongly disagree=1 to Strongly agree=5.
=1 if responses =5 or 4; and 0 otherwise.
Inconvenient ”Pay As You Go makes it easy to pay for my gas.”
To what extent do you agree with? Strongly disagree=1, to Strongly agree=5.
=1 if responses =1, 2 or 3; and =0 otherwise.
Preferred saving plan Regular payment throughout the year=1,
Voluntary savings target=2, Ad-hoc extra payments=3,
Summer fixed extra payments=4
Reminder on consumption=5, None=6
Goal achievement
Low =1 if ”I don’t usually achieve my goals” alone or in combination with
”I usually set-up weekly or monthly goals that I wish to achieve”,
”I usually avoid or delay a task that requires a lot of thinking” or
”I have difficulties in completing a task that requires organization”
and =0 otherwise
Medium =1 if ”I usually set-up weekly or monthly goals that I wish to achieve”,
”I usually avoid or delay a task that requires a lot of thinking” and/or
”I have difficulties in completing a task that requires organization”
and =0 otherwise.
High =”I usually achieve my goals” or ”I usually achieve my goals” with
”I usually set-up weekly or monthly goals that I wish to achieve”).
and =0 otherwise
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Appendix A. Appendix 2
Table A2. Correlations between variables characterizing individual heterogeneity
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1. Household adults 1
2. Female .03 1
3. Low income -.25*** .01 1
4. Medium income .10*** .02 -.71*** 1
5. High income .19*** -.05 -.38*** -.38*** 1
6. Basic education .06** .11*** .00 -.02 .02 1
7. Medium education -.05* -.05* -.04 .06** -.02 -.57*** 1
8. High education -.01 -.03 -.09*** -.02 .09*** -.30*** -.32*** 1
9. Low goal achievement .00 -.03 -.08 .02 -.01 .03 -.01 -.06** 1
10. Medium goal achievement -.06* .12*** .06* -.02 -.05 .04 -.03 -.02 -.20*** 1
11. High goal achievement .06* -.09*** -.07** .03 .06* -.06* .04 .04 -.37*** -.80*** 1
12. Self-disconnection .04 .03 .00 .02 -.03 .01 .03 -.02 .03 .12*** -.12*** 1
13. Emergency credit .07** .02 -.08*** .09*** -.01 -.02 .05** .01 .01 .07** -.08*** 0.21*** 1
Notes: ***, **, * stand for 1, 5, and 10 percent significant levels, respectively.
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Appendix B. Appendix 3
Sample question on saving plan choice
The following questions relate to how the payment plan may work and
we are looking for your thoughts on what would be the most beneficial / easy
to use. Before entering onto the payment plan, you would need to agree to a
tailored quote detailing your consumption patterns and spend over the year
- this would help you understand how you might manage the cost of your
gas with different saving options that suit your lifestyle and income. Some of
these options have been listed below and we’d like to know how these sound
to you.
The following options are variants of the savings plan. We’d like to know
how these saving plans A to E appeal to you. Please rate 1 - 5 where 1 is
not appealing and 5 is extremely appealing.
Regular payments throughout year
Based on the summary of your previous year’s consumption, you agree to
an equal weekly / monthly amount that you commit to paying through the
year. Regular equal payments would cover your consumption throughout the
year.
Voluntary Savings Target
You chose a target amount that you feel comfortable / confident in saving.
You’re responsible for meeting this target and it would be up to you whether
or not you achieved your target each month. The credit you saved would be
used to offset your winter consumption.
Ad-hoc Extra Payments
You make additional payments as and when you can afford to do so. You
would not have to nominate a target for your savings but the more you saved,
the more of your winter consumption would be offset.
Summer Fixed Extra Payments
You commit to additional fixed payments just during summer months.
These additional payments would be calculated on the basis of your winter
time gas consumption in the previous year. The extra payments would be
used to cover your higher gas payments in the wintertime.
Feedback on Consumption
Without changing your monthly payment plan, you receive regular feed-
back in the summer about your average gas payments. For example: “Last
34
year you spent £20 on gas between July and September and you spent £120
on gas between October and December”.
From the options listed in the question above which savings plan would
you prefer? Choose one option only:
1. Regular payments throughout year
2. Voluntary Savings Target
3. Ad-hoc Extra Payments
4. Summer Fixed Extra Payments
5. Feedback on Consumption
6. None of the above
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Table A3. Robustness check: SUBOP and SUBP
SUBOP SUBP
Coefficients Average marginal effects
ec (ordered) sd (ordered) ec (redefined) sd (redefined)
Demographics
65 and over -0.537** -0.411* -0.533* -0.721**
(0.210) (0.219) (0.275) (0.287)
Female 0.033 0.067 -0.056 0.115
(0.079) (0.084) (0.107) (0.112)
Household adults 0.089** 0.043 0.076 0.061
(0.035) (0.037) (0.048) (0.049)
Education
Medium 0.133* -0.001 0.053 -0.025
(0.080) (0.084) (0.109) (0.113)
High 0.076 -0.046 0.106 -0.018
(0.108) (0.113) (0.145) (0.150)
Behavioural characteristics
Saving behavior -0.248*** 0.017 -0.255*** -0.097
(0.073) (0.077) (0.099) (0.103)
Top up all year -0.320** -0.553*** -0.412** -0.572***
(0.131) (0.147) (0.168) (0.198)
Inconvenient 0.142* 0.431*** 0.092 0.496***
(0.080) (0.083) (0.106) (0.108)
Low goal achievement 0.158 0.200
(0.130) (0.173)






Prob> χ2 0.000 0.000
Obs. 905 683
Notes: SUBOP stands for seemingly unrelated bivariate ordered probit and SUBP
stands for seemingly unrelated bivariate probit. In the SUBP, the dependent variables
were redefined by dropping the ‘neither agree nor disagree option whereas in the SUBOP
we did not dropped this option in the dependent variables. Standard errors are in
parenthesis. The standard errors in the average marginal effects are calculated by the
Delta method. ***, **, * stand for 1, 5, and 10 percent significant levels, respectively.
LL stands for log likelihood. Age under 22 and Age to 34, none and low education, low
income and high goal achievement were used as reference categories. Age was was used
as control but is here omitted (with the exception of 65 and over).
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